Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

4-9-1957

Garibaldi v. Borchers Bros. [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Torts Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Garibaldi v. Borchers Bros. [DISSENT]" (1957). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 87.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/87

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Apr.1957]

GARIBALDI V'. BORCHERS BROS.

283

[48 C.2d 283; 309 P.2d 23]

1019, is not here applicable. That section permits the tenant
to remove trade fixtures during the term of the lease. Here
the lease had been terminated because of covenant broken
and the right of re-entry had attached and had been exercised.
'fhe judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence,
J., and McComb, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 8,
1957.

[S. F. No. 19326.

In Bank.

Apr. 9, 1957.]

ALBERT WALTER GARIBALDI, a Minor, etc., et al.,
Appellants, v. BORCHERS BROS. (a Corporation)
et al., Respondents.
[1] Automobiles-Instructions-Last Clear Chance.-In an action
for injuries sustained by a boy when he came in contact with
defendants' truck on a city street, where a formula instruction
on last clear chance given at plaintiffs' request was misleading
and confusing in its amplification of the prescribed elements
for application of the doctrine, plaintiffs could not complain of
the trial court's failure to include their proposed modification
of the instruction by adding to the requirement "That the
(truck driver) had actual knowledge of (the boy's) perilous
situation" the words "or that (the driver) knew facts from
which a reasonable person would have believed that (the boy)
was in peril," since the proposed modification would have increased the existing confusion in the instruction.
[2] Negligence--Instructions-Last Clear Chance.-An instruction
that the doctrine of last clear chance is invoked to defeat the
defense of contributory negligence only when, after plaintiff's
negligence has put him into a position of danger, its work as
an efficient agent of causation ceases and it does not play a
part in proximately causing the accident, but that when a
person's negligence places him in a position of danger, and
[2] Doctrine of last clear chance, notes, 92 A.L.R. 47; 119 A.L.R.
1041; 171 A.L.R. 1365. See also Cal.Jur., Negligence, § SO; Am.
Jur., Negligence, § 215.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 352; [2-4] Negligence,
§ 217; [5] Automobiles, § 320; [6, 7] Automobiles, § 343-8; [8]
Trial, § 178; [9] Automobiles,§ 322-3.
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thereafter it or its effect continues and as a proximately
causing factor brings about or helps to bring about the accithe law of contributory negligence applies and such
person cannot recover, is not objectionable as declaring that
if plaintiff continues to be negligent up to the moment of
thf.; impact he cannot recover from defendant who failed to
ex(,rcise the last clear chance to avert the accident, though
negligence was not a proximate cause thereof, since
sueh instruction states in effect that the doctrine does not apply
unless plaintiff's negligence has became "remote in causation"
:md that, if plaintiff's negligence or its effect continues so as
to be a "proximate cause" of the accident, such negligence
will bar a recovery.
[3 J !d.-Instructions-Last Clear Chance.-Where an instruction
on continuing negligence was immediately preceded by a
general last clear chance instruction reciting the elements of
the doctrine, including the circumstance of a negligent plaintil{ totally unaware of his impending peril and concluding
with the statement that if all prescribed "conditions [were J
found" to exist "with respect to the accident in question,"
the jury "must find against the defense of contributory negligence . . . because under such conditions the law holds the defendant liable for any injury suffered by [the J plaintiff and
proximately resulting from the accident despite the negligence
of [the J plaintiff," it was reasonable to assume that the jury
realized that in cases of negligent unawareness plaintiff's
negligence continues to the time of injury but that, if the element of the last clear chance doctrine are present, that rule
applies.
[4] !d.-Instructions-Last Clear Chance.-A technical instruction
on continuing negligence is of little, if any, assistance to the
average jury in applying the last clear chance doctrine;
when all essential elements for the application of last clear
ehance are present, the negligence of defendant who failed
to exercise the last clear chance to avoid the accident is
deemed in law to be the sole proximate cause of the accident and may be deemed responsible to plaintiff for the resulting damage despite the contributory negligence of plaintiff, and an instruction to that effect, coupled with proper instructions on the essential elements of the last clear chance
doctrine, would give the jury a clearer understanding of the
real issues for its determination and would avoid complicating
its deliberations by instructions which place on the jurors
the burden of rationalizing their findings and conclusions
with the ordinary concepts of proximate cause.
[5] Automobiles- Instructions- Assumption as to Conduct of
Others.-In an action for injuries sustained by a boy when
he carne in contact with defendants' truck on a city street, an
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instruction that a person exercising ordinary care has a right
to assume that others will perform their duty under the law,
but not when it is reasonably apparent or, in the exercise of
ordinary care, would be apparent to him that another is not
going to perform his duty, was not erroneous as instructing the
jury that the truck driver was entitled to assume that the boy
would obey the law, when considered with preceding instructions which properly told the jury that a child is held only to a
standard of care in accordance with his age and the existing
conditions, and that the driver was only entitled to assume
that the children would act as other children of like age
would ordinarily act under similar circumstances.
[6] !d.-Instructions- Contributory Negligence-Minors.-In an
action for injuries sustained by a boy when he came in contact with defendants' truck on a city street, an instruction
that before attempting to cross a street it is a pedestrian's duty
to make reasonable observations to learn the traffic conditions
confronting him, that the law places on him the continuing duty
to exercise ordinary care to avoid an accident, but that the
degree of ordinary care in the case of a minor is that ordinarily exercised by a child of like age, mental capacity :md
experience under the same or similar circumstances, emphasized
the determinative consideration to be not whether the boy
acted as an adult should, but whether he used the care ordinarily exercised by like children in similar circumstances,
and properly left the matter of whether or not he was charg·eable with contributory negligence to the jury.
[7] !d.-Instructions-Contributory Negligence- Minors.--In an
action for injuries sustained by a boy when he came in contact with defendants' truck on a city street, an instruction that
a pedestrian crossing a road at a point other than within a
marked crosswalk or an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection
must yield the right of way to all vehicles on the roadway so
near as to constitute an immediate hazard, but that such duty
was not absolute and that the jury must determine from the
facts whether the boy exercised the degree of care ordinarily
exercised by a child of like age, mental capacity and experience,
was not erroneous as absolutely requiring the boy to yield the
right of way to the truck.
[8] Trial-Instructions-Cautionary Instructions-Admissions.In a personal injury action, an instruction that evidence of
a party's oral admissions other than his own testimony should
be viewed with caution was proper though defendant admitted having made certain prior statements which were inconsistent with his account of the accident at the trial, where
there were other prior statements by him in evidence which
at the trial he did not admit having made.

[8] See Cal.Jur., Trial, §99; Am.Jur., Trial, §611 et seq.
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[9] Automobiles-Instructions-Speed.-In an action for injuries
sustained by a boy when he came in contact with defendants'
truck on a city street, refusal of plaintiffs' requested instruction on the existence of a prima facie speed limit of 25 miles
per hour at the time and place of the accident was not error
where, assuming that the accident happened in an area which
might have qualified as a residence district if properly signposted, there was no evidence of signposting other than the
mention of a single sign at some indefinite location, where the
fastest that any witness stated the truck was traveling at any
time was about 30 miles per hour, where the jury was fully
and correctly instructed on the basic speed law (Veh. Code,
§ 510), and where the jury found that the speed of the truck
was not a vital factor in the happening of the accident.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County. John D. Foley, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for injuries sustained by a boy when
he came in contact with defendants' truck on a city street.
Judgment for defendants affirmed.
Bruce F. Allen and Douglas, Zingheim & Allen for Appellants.
William J. Connolly and Donald F. Farbstein for Respondents.
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiffs, father and minor son, appeal
from a judgment in favor of defendants in an action for
damages for personal injuries sustained by the son when he
came in contact with defendants' truck. They maintain that
the court committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to their
contentions, the record does not support their position.
The accident occurred approximately midway between intersections on Sunol Street in San Jose on August 19, 1952,
about 10 :30 a. m. Sunol Street runs north and south, and
is 30 feet wide. There are residences on both sides of the
street in this area. At the time of the accident, cars were
parked solidly along the west side of Sunol Street, leaving
two lanes of traffic open. No parking was permitted on the
east side. A dirt strip four feet wide extended between the
sidewalk and the curb on this east side.
Plaintiff minor, then 8¥2 years old, and his 7-year-old
sister were walking north on the sidewalk on the east side
of the street. Defendants' concrete mixer truck was also
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proceeding north on the east side of the street. The driver
saw the children as he approached them and he kept them
under observation until his truck reached a point about 15
feet south of where they then were, when he looked straight
ahead. After he had passed the children he heard a scream
and the sound of something hitting the side of the truck.
'rhe boy was found lying in the street near the east curb.
A mark on the truck indicated that the point of contact was
on the right rear mudguard, 12 feet from the front of the
truck.
Defendant driver testified that he first observed the children when he was 200 to 250 feet from them; that his view
of them was unobstructed; that his speed then was about
20 miles per hour; that there was traffic approaching from
the opposite direction; that his truck was proceeding about
3 feet from the east curb; that when about 100 feet from
the place of the accident, he reduced his speed to 15 miles
per hour; that the children's backs were toward him and
they did not look at him at any time; that they were "on a
hop and a skip down the sidewalk"; and that they "kind
of jacked toward the west of the sidewalk.'' He further
testified that he did not see the children leave the sidewalk
or make any movement indicating that they were going on
the street, but he admitted having told the police officer at
the scene of the accident that he saw the boy step to the
curb. The driver also testified that he did not sound his horn
as he approached the children and only "lightly applied" the
brakes; that it was only after he heard the scream, that he
really applied the brakes and stopped "as quickly as [he]
could'' next to the curb.
The boy could not remember the accident. His sister, 9
years old at the time of the trial, testified that she and her
brother went from the sidewalk onto the dirt strip, where
they waited for one northbound truck to pass, and then
"when the second one (defendants') was coming, my brother
started to go out by the curb, and I don't think he saw the
truck, he was looking at me, and he told me to get back on
the sidewalk, and so I was in the dirt strip and the truck
came along and hit him.'' A neighbor testified that while
she did not see the boy hit, she had noticed defendants'
truck as it passed her house, which was just before the place
of the accident; that it swerved toward the east curb because
of an oncoming southbound truck; and that she estimated
defendants' truck was then going about 30 miles per hour.

288

GARIBALDI

v.

BoRCHERS BRos.

[48 C.2d

Defendants' truck, with its load of concrete, weighed about
15 tons.
At plaintiffs' request, the jury was instructed on the last
clear chance doctrine. The formula prescribing the essential
couditions for application of that doctrine has been recently
restated. (Brandelius v. City &; County of San Francisco,
47 Cal.2d 729, 743 [306 P.2d 432] .) Such restatement was
based upon the formula appearing in other decisions of this
L:ourt. (Daniels v. City &; County of San Fmncisco, 40 Cal.2d
614, 619 [255 P.2d 785] ; Peterson v. Burkhalter, 38 Cal.2d
107, 109-110 [237 P.2d 977]; Girdner v. Union Oil Co., 216
Cal. 197, 202 [13 P.2d 915] .)
The parties first are in dispute as to whether the last
clear chance doctrine was applicable at all here. Defendants
daim that the evidence only shows that the boy stepped
from his ''place of safety'' on the sidewalk or curb and into
the roadway after he had left the truck driver's view as
the truck proceeded past him; that until the boy entered
the roadway he was not in a "position of danger" (cf. Dalley
v. Williams, 73 Cal.App.2d 427, 435 [166 P.2d 595]), at
which time he apparently ran into the rear side of the truck;
and the truck driver therefore had no chance of avoiding
the impact. It seems difficult to find a basis for application
of the doctrine in view of the evidence presented and more
particularly, in view of the account of the only eye-witness
to the actual happening of the accident, the boy's sister. Her
testimony indicated that as the boy walked toward the curb,
he realized the danger of venturing into the roadway while
trucks were passing and, in fact, told her to get back on the
sidewalk as they waited. But assuming for the purpose of
discussion that under any possible view of the evidence the
last clear chance doctrine could be deemed applicable, the
jury was instructed with respect to that doctrine and apparently did not find all the necessary conditions for its
application to exist. Plaintiffs do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the adverse verdict, but
they do contend that the court erred in its omission of their
proposed modification of BAJI 205.
[1] The instruction given by the court followed the exact
language of BAJI 205. Plaintiffs proposed this BAJI instruction but had added to paragraph "Third" thereof the
following clause, which is italicized: ''Third: That the (truck
driver) had actual knowledge of (the boy's) perilous situation, or that (the driver) knew facts frorn wh,ich a reasonable
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person would have believed that (the boy) was in peril."
This italicized portion was not given. The BAJI instruction on last elear chance, in unmodified form, was analyzed
recently in Brandelius v. City &; County of San Francisco,
supra, 47 Cal.2d 729. It was there held to be erroneous
as it was found to be "misleading" and "confusing" in
its amplification of the prescribed elements for application
of the doctrine. Plaintiffs' proposed modification of the third
paragraph of the BAJI instruction would obviously have
increased the already existing confusion in the BAJI instruction. We therefore conclude that . plaintiffs may not
successfully complain of the failure of the trial court to include plaintiffs' proposed modification in the BAJI instruction, which instruction was given at plaintiffs' request.
[2] Plaintiffs argue that the force of the stated last
clear chance doctrine was nullified by the giving of the following instruction on continuing negligence. (BAJI 205-A,
'fhird Paragraph) : "'rhe Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
is invoked to defeat the defense of contributory negligence
only in a case when, after plaintiff's negligence has put
him into a position of danger, its work as an efficient agent
of causation ceases, and it does not play a part in proximately
causing the accident. When, on the other hand, a person's
negligence not only places him in a position of danger, but
thereafter it or its effect continues, and as a proximately
causing factor, brings about, or helps to bring about, the
accident, then the law of contributory negligence applies,
and such person may not recover." Plaintiffs object to this
instruction, claiming that it declares that if plaintiff continues to be negligent up to the moment of the impact, he
cannot recover from the defendant who failed to exercise
the last clear chance to avert the accident, even though plaintiff's negligence was not a proximate cause thereof. Such
proposition, of course, is not the law (Doran v. City &;
County of San Francisco, 44 Cal.2d 477, 486-487 [283 P.2d
1]; Sills v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 40 Cal.2d 630, 639
[255 P.2d 795]), and the instruction does not so state. The
first sentence states in effect that the doctrine does not apply
unless the plaintiff's negligence has become "remote in causation." (Center v. Yellow Cab Co., 216 Cal. 205, 207-208
[13 P.2d 918] .) The second sentence states that if the
plaintiff's negligence or its effect continues so as to be a
"proximate cause" of the accident, then such negligence
will bar a recovery. (Gillette v. City of San Francisco, 58
48 C.2d-10
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Cal..App.2d 434, 440 [136 P.2d 611].) Thus, the instruction
is in line with the authorities dealing with the last clear
chance doctrine which have rationalized that doctrine, in
its relation to the doctrine of contributory negligence, on
the basis of proximate cause. (Sparks v. Redinger, 44 Cal.2d
121, 124-125 [279 P.2d 971] ; Girdner v. Union Oil Co.,
supra, 216 Cal. 197, 203-204; see annos: 92 .A.L.R. 47; 119
A.I.~.R. 1041; 171 .A.L.R. 365.)
[3] However, while this instruction may be technically
correct, it might be argued that it could be confusing to a
lay jury were it not for other considerations. The instruction was immediately preceded by the general last clear
chance instruction (B.AJI 205), reciting the elements of the
doctrine, including the circumstance of the negligent plaintiff totally unaware of his impending peril, and concluding
with the statement that if all the prescribed "conditions
[were] found" to exist "with respect to the accident in
question," then the jury "must find against the defense of
contributory negligence . . . because under such conditions
the law holds the defendant liable for any injury suffered
by [the] plaintiff and proximately resulting from the accident despite the negligence of [the] plaintiff." (Emphasis
added.) With these instructions so submitting plaintiffs'
right to recovery in terms of proximate cause, it seems reasonable to assume that the jury realized that in this as "in
every case of negligent unawareness plaintiff's negligence
continues to the very time of the injury, but if the elements
of the last clear chance doctrine are present that rule nonetheless applies." (Overacker v. Key System, 99 Cal..App.2d
281, 284 [221 P.2d 754].) Accordingly, plaintiffs' objection
to the instruction on continuing negligence may not prevail.
(See Clark v. Vieroth, 141 Cal..App.2d 462, 465-466 [296
P.2d 823].)
[4] Before concluding this phase of the discussion we
should state that it appears that any instruction such as
B.AJI 205-.A, Third Paragraph, is technical in nature and is
of little, if any, assistance to the average jury in applying
the last clear chance doctrine. It would be more helpful,
in our opinion, if the courts would frankly recognize that
the last clear chance doctrine is in reality an exception to,
or modification of, the ordinary rules making plaintiff's contributory negligence a bar to plaintiff's recovery. (See Prosser
on Torts, second ed., 1955, p. 290.) In other words, when
all the essential elements for the application of the last
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clear chance are present, then the negligence of the defendant, who failed to exercise the last clear chance to avoid
the accident, is deemed in law to be the sole proximate cause
of the accident; and under these circumstances, the defendant may be held responsible to plaintiff for the resulting
damage despite the contributory negligence of plaintiff. An
instruction to that effect, coupled with proper instructions
on the essential elements of the last clear chance doctrine,
would give the jury a clearer understanding of the real
issues for its determination and would avoid complicating
the jury's deliberations by instructions which place upon the
jurors the burden of rationalizing their findings and conclusions with the ordinary concepts of proximate cause.
[5] Plaintiffs next contend that the jury was erroneously
instructed that the truck driver was entitled to assume that
the injured boy would obey the law without regard for his
tender age. rrhe challenged instruction reads as follows :
''A person who, himself, is exercising ordinary care has a
right to assume that others, too, will perform their duty
under the law, and he has a further right to rely and act
on that assumption. Thus it is not negligence for such a
person to fail to anticipate an accident which can be occasioned only by a violation of law or duty by another. However, an exception should be noted: the rights just defined
do not exist when it is reasonably apparent to one, or in the
exercise of ordinary care would be apparent to him, that
another is not going to perform his duty." (Emphasis added.)
This instJ;_uction must be considered with the instructions,
requested by plaintiffs, which preceded it: ''Ordinarily it
is necessary to exercise greater caution for the protection
and safety of a young child than for an adult who possesses
normal physical and mental faculties. A person operating
a motor vehicle must anticipate the ordinary behavior of
children. The fact that they usually cannot and do not exercise the same degree of prudence for their own safety as
adults, that they often are thoughtless and impulsive, imposes a duty to exercise a proportional vigilance and caution
on a person operating a motor vehicle, and from whose conduct injury to a child may result. (Emphasis added.)
''The presence of children is in itself a warning requiring
exercise of care for their safety. The conduct of children
is unpredictable and a person operating a motor vehicle
should anticipate their thoughtlessness and impulsiveness. A
greater degree of care is required of a driver of a vehicle
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when he knows a small child is at play than in a case where
a person of mature discretion is involved.''
Considering these last mentioned instructions together,
it is clear that the jury was properly told that a child is
only held to a standard of care in accordance with his age
and the existing conditions (Galbraith v. Thompson, 108
Cal.App.2cl 617, 621 [239 P .2d 468]), and that here the
driver 1vas only entitled to assume that the children would
act as other children of like age would ordinarily act under
similar circumstances. (Hilyar v. Union Ice Co., 45 Cal.2d
30, 36-37 [286 P.2d 21].)
[6] Plaintiffs next contend that the jury was instructed
according to the rules required of an adult pedestrian. Such
is not the case. At plaintiffs' request, the accepted instruction on the standard of care required of a minor was given
(BAJI 147), the first sentence of which reads: "A child
is not held to the same standard of conduct as an adult and
is only required to exercise that degree of care which ordinarily is exercised by children of like age, mental capacity
and experience.'' Then followed the general instruction, of
which plaintiffs complain, as to the duty owed by a pedestrian
while crossing a street. (BAJI 201-C.) This latter instruction, given at defendants' request but with certain modifications in recognition of the minor plaintiff's status, reads:
"Before attempting to <~ross a street that is being used for
the traffic of motor vehicles, it is a pedestrian's duty to
make reasonable observations to learn the traffic conditions
confronting him; to look to that vicinity from which, were
a vehicle approaching, it would immediately endanger his
passage ; and to try to make a sensible decision whether it
is reasonably safe to attempt the crossing. ·what observations he should make, and what he should do for his own
safety, while crossing the street are matters which the law
does not attempt to regulate in detail and for all occasions,
except in this respect; it does place upon him the continuing
duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid an accident, the
degree of m·dinary care in the ease of a minor is that ordinarily exercised by a child of like age, mental capacity ancl
!'.rpcricnee, ?tnder the same or similar circumstances." (Emphasis added.) Thus it is clear that the instructions emphasized the determinative consideration to be not whether
the minor plaintiff acted as an adult should, but whether
he used the care ordinarily exercised by like children in
similar circumstances. Accordingly, the matter of whether
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or not the boy was chargeable with contributory negligence
in the happening of the accident was a question of fact
properly left to the jury. (Raggio v. 111allory, 10 Cal.2d 723,
727 [76 P.2d 660] ; Richardson v. Ribosso, 120 Cal.App.
641, 643 [8 P.2d 226]; De Nardi v. Palanca, 120 Cal.App.
371, 376 [8 P.2d 220].)
[7] Nor is there merit to plaintiffs' further claim that
the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the minor
plaintiff was required to yield the right of way to defendants'
truck. The criticized instruction reads as follows : ''·while
as to a roadway locality such as that involved in this ease,
a pedestrian has a right to cross the road at any point, these
factors of consideration enter into the question of what conduct is required of him in the exercise of ordinary care.
First: If he crosses at a point other than within a marked
crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, the law requires him to yield the right of way to all
vehicles on the roadway so near as to constitute an immediate hazard. Second: The amount of caution required to
constitute ordinary care increases as does the danger that a
reasonably prudent person, in like position, would apprehend
in the situation.
''This duty to yield the right of way is not an absolute
one, and it is for you to determine from the facts, whether
the minor plaintiff, Albert Garibaldi, exercised reasonable
care under the circumstances, that is, the degree of care ordinarily exercised by a child of like age, rnental capacity and
experience." (Emphasis added.) This instruction supplied
the precise language that was found wanting in the cases
to which plaintiffs refer. (Cole v. Ridings, 95 Cal.App.2d
136, 141 [212 P.2d 597] ; Shipway v. Monise, 59 Cal.App.2d
565, 571 [139 P.2d 60].) The second paragraph clearly and
correctly informed the jury that the boy's duty to yield the
right of way was not absolute, and that the basic test was
whether he as a minor exercised reasonable care under all
the existing circumstances. (See Gavin v. Watt, 144 Cal.
App.2d 238, 242-243 [300 P.2d 842].)
[8] Plaintiffs next contend that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury, at defendants' request, that "Evidence
of the oral admission of a party, other than his own testimony in this trial ought to be viewed by you with caution."
Plaintiffs claim that it was not proper to give this instruction because the truck driver at the trial admitted having
made certain prior statements which were inconsistent with
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the account of the accident as given at the trial. These admissions then became a part of the driver's own testimony
and so did not come within the "viewing with caution" rule.
But in addition to these admissions, there were other prior
statements of the driver in evidence which at the trial he
did not admit having made, and which warranted the giving
of this cautionary instruction. (See Crawford v. Alioto, 105
Cal.App.2d 45, 50-51 [233 P.2d 148]; Freeman v. Nickerson,
77 Cal.App.2d 40, 62 [174 P.2d 688] .)
[9] Plaintiffs finally object to the trial court's refusal
to give their requested instruction on the existence of a
prima facie speed limit of 25 miles per hour in effect at the
time and place of the accident. It will be recalled that the
accident happened in 1952 and prior to the 1953 amendment
of section 511 of the Vehicle Code. They claim that Sunol
Street was in a residence district (V eh. Code, § 90), where
the prima facie speed limit was 25 miles per hour. (Ibid,
§ 511, subd. (b) (1).) Assuming that the accident happened
in an area which might have qualified as a residence district,
if properly signposted, the requested instruction was not
proper unless there was evidence to show that speed limit
signs were then in place at the entrance to the alleged residential district or to a contiguous residential district. (Daniels
v. City & County of San Francisco, supra, 40 Cal.2d 614,
624; Guerra v. Brooks, 38 Cal.2d 16, 19-20 [236 P.2d 807] ;
Reynolds v. Filomeo, 38 Cal.2d 5, 11-13 [236 P.2d 801] .)
'l'here was no evidence of such signposting other than the
mention of a single sign at some indefinite location. Such
vague and indefinite evidence was insufficient. Furthermore,
the fastest that any witness stated that the truck was traveling
at any time was about 30 miles per hour. The jury was
fully and correctly instructed on the basic speed law (Veh.
Code, § 510), and after an examination of the record, it
reasonably appears that the jury found that the speed of the
truck was not a vital factor in the happening of the accident.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
McComb, ,J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion holds that various instructions given
to the jury were not prejudicially erroneous. I cannot agree.
The same instruction on last clear chance that was given in
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Brandelius v. City & County of San Francisco, 47 Cal.2d
729 [306 P.2d 432], was given in this case at plaintiff's request but an addition thereto* was stricken by the court. The
majority opinion now says as it did in the Brandelius case
that the instruction without the addition was incorrect and
confusing; that therefore plaintiff cannot complain of it beeause it was given at his request and the addition thereto (not
given) would have added to the confusion. I reiterate the
comments in my dissent in the Brandelius case ( 4 7 Cal.2d
746) to the effect that the instruction without the addition
was not erroneous nor confusing; that the addition was proper and should have been given. Even if the unmodified
instruction was confusing the addition should have been
given. It in effect told the jury that it could find actual
knowledge by defendant of the boy's perilous position if a
reasonable person would have believed he was in a perilous
position, that is, if the facts would justify an inference that
defendant knew of the boy's perilous position despite his
protests to the contrary. In Belinsky v. Olsen, 38 Cal.2d 102,
105 [237 P.2d 645], this court pointed out that even though
the defendant says he did not have such knowledge the facts
may reasonably show that he did. We there stated: "The
second factor is lacking, urges defendant, because there is
no showing that defendant was aware of plaintiff's perilous
position or knew he could not escape therefrom. That depends
upon the view one takes of the evidence. It is true that
defendant testified that he did not see plaintiff's car until he
was directly behind it, when plaintiff drove his car into the
line of traffic in front of him, and that plaintiff's car was in
motion at the time of the impact. Other evidence shows, however, that defendant was looking straight ahead as he approached plaintiff's car and his view was unobstructed. It
may be inferred therefrom that he saw plaintiff's motionless
car extending into the line of traffic. . . . Under the evidence
most favorable to plaintiff, defendant could have seen plaintiff's car standing in the road ahead of him for a minute before
the impact and thus could, by the exercise of ordinary care,
have avoided the accident." (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff
was entitled to have the jury advised on this issue especially
in this case where, as in the Selinsky case, defendant said he
*The addition was: "That the (truck driver) had actual knowledge
of (the boy's) perilous situation, or that (the driver) knew facts from
which a reasonable person would have believed that (the boy) was in
peril."
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was watching the boy and his view was unobstructed. In
Peterson v. B1~rkhalte1 , 38 Cal.2d 107, 111 [237 P.2d 977],
we said: ''Also relied upon for reversal of the judgment is
the testimony of Burkhalter that when he first saw Peterson
he was not aware of a possible collision. But the application
of the doctrine of last clea1 chance t's not dependent ttpon an
admiss'ion by the defendant that he expected that there might
be a collision. As stated in Cady v. Sanfm·d, 57 Cal.App.
218, 226 [207 P. 45], 'It was not necessary that appellant
should actnally know that an accident was inevitable if he
failed to e:re1 cise caTc. It is enough ·if the circumstances
of which he had knowledge were such as to convey to the
mind of a reasonably prudent man a qttestion as to whethe1·
Tespondent wot~ld be able to escape a collision.'
''Burkhalter compares his situation to that of the defendant
in Johnson v. SmdhwesteTn Engineering Co., 41 Cal.App.2d
623 [107 P.2d 417]. There the rule of last clear chance was
held to be inapplicable because of a lack of evidence showing
knowledge by the defendant of the plaintiff's danger. ,Johnson had fal1en asleep while driving his automobile, and there
was no evidence that the driver of the other car was aware of
this fact. For that reason, it was held, the defendant did
not know that Johnson was in a position of danger, and di(1
not have the last clear chance to avoid the collision.
"Burkhalter knew that Peterson was oblivious to the impending collision, and he exemws his failure to do anything
to avert the accident upon the ground that he had no reason to
expect continuing negligence on the part of Peterson. However, there is ample evidence from which the jury could determine that a reasonably prudent man, knowing the facts
of which Burkhalter was aware, should have foreseen that
Peterson might not turn or stop his motor scooter. Under
such circumstances, it was negligent for Burkhalter to proceed tmvard the intersection ading upon a contrary m;sumption." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, in the instant case,
defendant could be said to have known of the presence of a
very young child on the curb especia1ly in view of the rule
that : ''A greater degree of care is required of a driver
towards children than towards adults. The care required is
greater still when the driver knows that small children are
at play in the immediate vicinity. This is so because their
conduct is unpredictable. The driver must anticipate their
thoughtlessness and impulsiveness. Their very presence is
a warning requiring the exercise of eare. ·while a driver in
4

4

4
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approaching a child upon a street or highway is not bound
to guard against every possible contingency, yet where he
sees a child in a plac·.e of danger, or might reasonably apprehend that if approached without warning the child would
through fright or bewilderment place itself in danger, it is
his duty to keep his car under such control as is reasonably
necessary to avoid a collision. If he has know·ledge of the
presence of children in the immediate vicinity, he may be
charged with negligence in injuring one of them, even though
he did not see the injured child, particularly where the injury
occurs near the child's home or a school. A fortiori, the driver
may be held responsible where he sees the child approaching
the path of his vehicle.
''The driver may be liable under the doctrine of last clear
chance for an injury to a child, even under the assumption
that the child's conduct amounted to contributory negligence,
where he sees the child in the path of his vehicle in danger
of being run over and realizes that the child is unaware of
the approach of the vehicle." (7 Cal.Jur.2d, Automobiles,
§ 271; see also 30 A.L.R.2d 5.) In Swndalis v. Jenny, 132
Cal.App. 307, 310 [22 P.2d 545], it was held that defendant
was negligent as a matter of law where a child ran into the
side of his car, and on the issue of contributory negligence
the court said : ''The next question is, was the plaintiff guilty
of contributory negligence? To this question there can be but
one answer, and that is in the negative. Even if it were negligence for a child of three years of age to stand in or near
the center of a city street and look down, apparently unaware of the approach of an automobile, we are unable to see
that such negligence contributed proximately to the injury
that came to him by reason of the negligence of the defendant
in the manner hereinbefore stated. By the exercise of ordinary care defendant should have seen and realized that plaintiff was unaware of the approach of the automobile, and his
failure so to do placed upon him the whole blame for the
accident." In Hilyar v. Union Ice Co., 45 Cal.2d 30, 36 [286
P.2d 21], quoting from Conroy v. Perez, 64 Cal.App.2d 217,
224 [148 P.2d 680] : " 'The presence of children is in itself a
warning requiring the exercise of care for their safety . . . .
Moreover, if the evidence shows that a driver has knowledge
of the presence of children he may be held to have been responsible although it appears that he did not see the injured
child in time to prevent the injury. . . . ' . . . In Freeland v.
Jewel Tea Co., 118 Cal.App.2d 764, 769 (258 P.2d 1032], it
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was held that it is ordinarily necessary to exercise greater
care for the protection and safety of young children than
for adult persons possessing normal and mature faculties
(Conroy v. Perez, supra, 64 Cal.App.2d 217, 224); that their
conduct is unpredictable and one operating a motor vehicle

should anticipate their thoughtlessness and impulsiveness
(Shannon v. Central-Gaither U. Sch. Dist., supra, 133 Cal.
App. 124 [23 P .2d 769]). It was also held that the presence
of children is in itself a warning requiring the exercise of
care for their safety." (Emphasis added.)
Hence in the instant case defendant was bound to anticipate unpredictable action by the child who was playing along
the curb. Knowing the child was there, and the likelihood
of his going into the street, defendant had the duty to take
precautions, but he took none. The added portion of the instruction requested by plaintiff should therefore have been
given because it took into consideration the factors involved
in a child's presence on the street and what defendant was
required to anticipate in regard thereto.
The next instruction given is also clearly erroneous.* Contrary to the statement in the majority opinion, this instruction advised the jury that the last clear chance doctrine was
not applicable if plaintiff's negligence continued up to the
time of the impact. So interpreted it is conceded to be wrong;
indeed the majority opinion says such instruction should not
be given. The instruction states that the doctrine may apply
"only" when plaintiff's negligence has ceased; and where
plaintiff's negligence "contim~es" up to the time of the accident, he cannot recover because of his contributory negligence.
The majority seeks to escape this interpretation on the assumption that the continuance of plaintiff's negligence is said
to cease if it is no longer the proximate cause of the accident.
The proximate cause feature would only confuse the jury because, as pointed out in the majority opinion, it is fictional
reasoning to say that the last clear chance is based on the
theory that where applicable, the plaintiff's negligence has
*''The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is invoked to defeat the defense
of contributory negligence only in a case when, after plaintiff's negligence
has put him into a position of danger, its work as an efficient agent
of causation ceases, and it does not play a part in proximately causing
the accident. When, on the other hand, a person's negligence not only
places him in a position of danger, but thereafter it or its effect
continues, and as a proximately causing factor, brings about, or helps
to bring about, the accident, then the law of contl'ibutory negligence
applies, and such person may not recover.''
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ceased to be the proximate cause of the accident. Here the
jury was told that if plaintiff's negligence ceased before the
impact the doctrine applied as it was not then the proximate
cause of the accident. No one should expect the jury to follow such intricate and finespun reasoning. To the jury the
plaintiff is still negligent, he continues to be so and the jury
would naturally so assume; his negligence would still be a
cause of the accident to them even though the defendant
could have avoided it by the exercise of ordinary care. But
they are told that they may not mitigate snch an anomalous
situation by the application of the last elear chance doctrine.
This is especially true in this case where we have a child
involved and consideration must be given to defendant's
duty in respect to a child on the curb in close proximity
to his moving truck. The jury would normally assume that
the child's actions would be negligent if he were an adult
and his negligence continued up to the time of the accident
and were one of the causes of the accident. Moreover, the
instruction defining proximate cause informed the jury that
a cause which produces injury, is proximate.* The jury was
further instructed that ''. . . if you further find that the
negligence of both proximately caused the accident, then if
you so find, your verdict must be for the defendants." It
is reasonable to suppose that the jury would conclude that
conduct of the child helped produce the injury-was a proximate cause and the jury would not therefore apply the last
clear chance doctrine under the instrnrtion now discussed.
Likewise the instruction told the jury that defendant had
a right to assume that the child would perform his duty
and obey the law, and hence, if he did not anticipate such
conduct by the child, there was no negligence. It is true,
as stated by the majority, that thereafter the jury was instructed as to what conduct to expect from a child, but that
instruction did not cure the one plaintiff attacks. The instructions are conflicting, as the jury was told in one breath
that defendant need not anticipate that a child might act
as an adult-reasonably and aceording to law-and in the
next, that a child's actions are not measured the same way
*''The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
It is the efficient cause, the one that necessarily sets in operation the
factors that accomplish the injury. It may operate directly or through
intermediate agencies or through conditions created by such agencies."
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as an adult's. In the instructions with reference to the
conduct of children the jury vvas not informed that defendant
should "anticipate" unpredictable action by a child. The
jury would be confused because, it would not know whether
to apply the adult standard or child standard in evaluating
defendant's conduct, and this was the very essence of plaintiff's case, that is, whether knowing that the child was playing at the curb, defendant took proper precautions, or could
proceed with the assumption that the child would not run
out into the street.
The error in the instruction now discussed was further
emphasized by the giving of instructions on the duty of a
pedestrian in crossing a street phrased in the terms of an
adult pedestrian-that he must yield the right of way when
not crossing in a crosswalk. This is also in conflict with the
duty imposed upon the defendant to anticipate the conduct
of a small child, and, in effect, negatives it.
Considering all of the foregoing instructions, it is evident
that the jury was placed in a position where it could not
apply the appropriate duty of defendant toward a child
playing near the curb of a street nor measure the child's
duty under the circumstances. The instructions were irreconcilable. Defendant, knowing of the child's presence, playing
near the street, oblivious to defendant's truck, also knew,
or was bound to know, that the ehild was likely to enter the
street, yet he did nothing to cope with such a contingency.
He did not slow down his truck, come to a stop or sound
his horn. Under these circumstances, the jury could have
found, if properly instructed, that he had a last clear chanee
to avoid the accident but failed to avail himself of it.
The last clear chance doctrine like res ipsa loquitur was
evolved by great liberal minded judges to ameliorate the
rigor of the common law in its application to the law of
negligence. (See, excellent article by Myron L. Garon, member of the Los Angeles Bar, entitled ''Recent Developments
in California's Last Clea1· Chance Doctrine," 40 Cal.L.Rev.
404.) It is my view that these doctrines should be applied
liberally to the end that relief may be granted to those who
suffer injuries as the result of the negligent conduct of others.
The application of these doctrines has been greatly restricted
by recent decisions of this eourt which indicate a marked
conservative trend. (Rodabaugh v. Tekus, 39 Cal.2d 290 [246
P.2d 663] ; Doran v. City &: County of 8an Francisco, 44
Cal.2d 477 [283 P.2d 1] ; Brandeli11s v. City & County of
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S. F., 47 Cal.2d 729 [306 P.2d 432]; Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hospital, 47 Ca1.2d 509 [305 P.2d 36];
Danner v. Litk1>ns, 47 Cal.2d 327 [303 P.2d 724]; Barrera
v. De La Torre, ante, p. 166 [308 P.2d 724], filed March
22, 1957.) ·whether this conservative trend is in accord with
public interest may be open to serious question. In my opinion
it is more in keeping with the public interest that these
doctrines be liberally applied by our courts.
I would therefore reverse the judgment.

[Crim. No. 5981.
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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN E. CHEARY,
Appellant.
[1] Homicide-Murder in First Degree-Killing in Perpetration of
Certain Felonies.-To prove defendant guilty of first degree
murder on either the ground that the deceased's death resulted
from injuries inflicted on her by defendant in an attempt to
rape her or in the perpetration of a burglary by breaking and
entering the home of deceased's daughter with intent to rape
the daughter, it was incumbent on the prosecution to prove
that defendant had the specific intent to rape when he entered
the daughter's home or that he had the specific intent to rape
when he assaulted the deceased.
[2] Id.-Evidence.-Regardless of whether or not defendant in a
first degree murder case had the intent to rape deceased's
daughter when he went to the daughter's home, the jury could
reasonably infer, from his forcing open the door and grabbing
the daughter after being informed that he was not welcome,
that defendant then had the specific intent to rape.
[3] !d.-Defenses-Intoxication: Province of Court and Jury.If defendant in a murder case was so intoxicated that he did
not, as charged, have the specific intent to rape either the deceased or her daughter at the time he went to the daughter's
(1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 77; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 39.
McK. Dig. References: (1, 13] Homicide, § 15( 6); [2] Homicide,
§145(3); [3] Homicide, §§28, 163; [4] Homicide, §159; [5, 6]
Jury, § 103(7); [7, 9] Criminal Law, § 522; [8, 10) Criminal
Law, § 524; (11] Homicide, §§ 185, 190; [12] Homicide, § 267;
[14] Criminal Law,§ 331; [15] Criminal Law,§ 1404; [16] Criminal Law, § 1086; [17] Criminal Law, § 1402; [18, 19] Criminal
Law,§ 1404(13); [20, 21] Criminal Law,§ 619; (22] Criminal Law,
§ 617; [23, 25] Criminal Law,§ 1404(12); [24] Criminal Law,§ 624.

